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Hitchcock: Transferable Development Rights

NOTE

SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL
PLANNING AGENCY: APPLYING
THE TAKINGS RIPENESS RULE
TO LAND USE REGULATIONS
AND TRANSFERABLE
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION

In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, l the Ninth
Circuit held that a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments was not ripe in the absence of the
landowner's application for a final decision and the failure to
demonstrate that such an application would be futile.2 The
court identified the necessary application as a request to the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") to transfer the Suitum property's development rights to another property.3 The
1. 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) (·Suitum In (per Panner, O.M., Senior United
States District Judge for the District of Oregon sitting by designation, Schroeder, M.,
and Alarcon, A., Circuit Judges) rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (·Suitum lV").
2. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 364. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the limited futility
exception to the ripeness doctrine. See id. at 363. Under this doctrine, the final decision requirement is excused if the plaintiff shows that fulfillment of the requirement
would be an idle and futile act or that the application procedures are unfair. See id.
(citing Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1990); Kinzli
v. Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1987».
3. See Suitum 11,80 F.3d at 364. The TRPA was created in 1969 by the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact. Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969), amended by Pub.
L. No. 96-551; 94 Stat. 3233 (1980); CAL. GoV'T CODE § 66801 (West 1969), amended by
CAL. GoV'T CODE
§ 66801 (1980); NEV. REv. STAT. § 277.200 (1969), amended by
NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 277.200 (1980). In 1968, California and Nevada entered into
an interstate agreement designed to ensure resource conservation and development
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Ninth Circuit stated that until the property owner requested a
transfer of development rights ("TDRs"), it would not be possible to determine the nature and extent of permitted development.' As a result, the case was not ripe because the court
could not know the full economic impact of TRPA's regulations
on the Suitum property or whether those regulations had gone
"too far."s
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit and held that the claim was ripe for adjudication. 6 The Supreme Court found that Suitum satisfied the
"final decision" ripeness test because no more discretionary
TRPA decisions remained.' The Court held that the awarding
of the TDRs was an administrative function and the valuation
of the TDRs was an issue of fact that the trial court could have
determined from the evidence presented.s The Supreme
Court's decision was logical given that the record contained
ample evidence to determine the value of the TDRs as either a

control in the Lake Tahoe Basin. See California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766
F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1985), amended by 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985). The agreement, known as the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, became effective when it received the consent of Congress in December 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360
(1969). In 1980, California and Nevada extensively amended the Compact with the
subsequent approval of Congress. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). One of the
most significant changes in the 1980 Compact is the requirement that TRPA develop
and establish environmental threshold carrying capacities for the Lake Tahoe Basin
and amend the regional plan to achieve and maintain these thresholds. See Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d at 1310. TRPA incorporated a land capability classification system into the plan that identified sensitive stream environment zones (SEZs)
where development would be curtailed. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 361; Tahoe Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132 (D. Nev.
1986). The 1987 Plan adopted by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency allows for
transfer of a property's land coverage development rights to another parcel within the
same hydrologic zone. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 361. Residential development rights
may be transferred anywhere within the Lake Tahoe Basin. See id. This allows an
undeveloped property within an environmentally sensitive area, where the 1987 Plan
restricts new development, to transfer and sell development rights to other properties
outside restricted development areas. See id.
4. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362.
5. See id. (quoting Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1453).
6. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) ("Suitum
1V").

.

7. See id. at 1667, 1670.
8. See id. at 1668.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/7

2

Hitchcock: Transferable Development Rights

1998]

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

89

development right of the property or a compensation mechanism.9
The Supreme Court's narrow holding, however, did not address the issue of adequate "state procedures" for compensation, which is normally the second hurdle of the ripeness test.lO
Instead, the Court found this test inapplicable.l l As such, a
thorough interpretation and application of the two hurdle,
regulatory takings ripeness test was not achieved. 12 In addition, the majority opinion did not address the question of
whether TDRs should be considered a property use, to assess
whether a taking has occurred, or as compensation, to determine whether full compensation has been supplied for a
taking. 13 The pending resolution of this issue will have a significant effect on the design of environmental protection
strategies within land use regulations and the ability of TDR
programs to withstand legal challenges.
Section II of this note sets forth the facts and procedural
history of Suitum. The background of ripeness in the context of
government regulation of land use and constitutional takings
claims is examined in Section III. The major area of inquiry is
the evolution and application of the Williamson County two
hurdle, "final decision" and "state procedures," ripeness test.14
The analysis of both the Ninth Circuit opinion and the reversing United States Supreme Court opinion are presented in Section IV. Section V evaluates the differing positions of the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court regarding the application
of the ripeness test to TDRs. The district court's likely approaches to applying the state procedures test in Suitum on
remand are then discussed, with the conclusion that Suitum
will meet the state procedures test for ripeness. Suitum will
undoubtedly make its way back to the Ninth Circuit and possi-

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id.
See id. at 1665 n.8.
See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 1665 n.8.
See id.
See id. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring).

14. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186,194 (1985).
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bly the Supreme Court on the takings issue, and this section
also examines the issue of whether TDRs are a property use or
merely a compensation for a taking, as raised in Justice
Scalia's concurrence. I5 Section VI concludes that there is ample precedent and evidence in Suitum to hold that that the
TDRs are a property right.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1972, the plaintiff, Bernadine Suitum, purchased a single-family residential lot in Incline Village, Nevada.I6 In 1989,
Suitum received a residential allocation from Washoe County
for construction of a house. I7 Suitum submitted building plans
to TRPA for approval of a single family residence. I8 TRPA staff
conducted a field verification of Suitum's property and determined that it was located entirely within a Stream Environment Zone ("SEZ"), according to the criteria of the 1987 Plan.I9

15. Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, No. 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum r). The lot was purchased in the
Mill Creek Subdivision located in Incline Village. See id. The complaint stated that
due to a variety of circumstances, including the illness and subsequent death of her
husband, Bernadine Suitum was not in a position to undertake construction of a home
until recently. See id. The subdivision in which the lot is located was substantially
built out, and Suitum's lot was surrounded on three sides by existing residences and on
the fourth side by an improved street with utilities. See id.
17. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Suitum Ir). Under TRPA's 1987 Plan, a residential allocation is required prior to
construction of additional residential units within the Lake Tahoe Basin. See Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances, Chapter 33, Allocation of Development.
The allocations are assigned to the counties within TRPA's jurisdiction. See id. The
counties then assign the residential allocations to property owners. See id. Ten percent of the residential allocations in Washoe County are reserved for parcels with Individual Parcel Evaluation System (lPES) scores below the current qualification level,
which would include Suitum's parcel. See id. Six allocations were reserved for such
properties in Washoe County. See Defendant's Memorandum Concerning its Transfer
of Development Program, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, No. 91-040 (D. Nev.
Apr. 1, 1996). The allocations for parcels with low IPES scores were assigned, upon
application, to the property owners by random drawing. See id
18. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I (No. 91-040).
19. See Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
September 17, 1986. Stream Environment Zones (SEZ) are areas with surface water,
riparian vegetation or alluvial soils. TRPA Code of Ordinances, Chapter 37. Protection
of these areas was considered essential to preserve the water quality of Lake Tahoe.
See id.
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As a result, the lot was assigned an Individual Parcel Evalua-

tion System ("IPES") score of zero, precluding development of a
house on the property.20 Suitum appealed the field verification
classifying the property as a SEZ with an IPES score of zero.21
TRPA denied the appeal and upheld the SEZ designation and
the resulting IPES score.22 Suitum did not apply to TPRA to
transfer her residential developments right and available land
coverage to another property under the TDR program.23
Following the TRPA Board's rejection of her appeal, Suitum
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada.24 The complaint alleged an unconstitutional taking
and violations of substantive due process and equal protection
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, resulting from
TRPA's improper exercise of police power when it refused Suitum a permit to build a home on a residential lot.25 Suitum
requested that TRPA's action be declared invalid and that
TRPA be ordered to allow construction of a single family residence on her lot.26 Suitum also requested just compensation

20. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 361. The IPES was incorporated into the 1987 Region Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin. Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, pp. VII. 3-4, September 17, 1986. The IPES system is the
basis for scoring the environmental sensitivity and developability of a parcel, asseBBing
erosion hazard, runoff potential, accessibility, water influence areas, condition of the
watershed, ability to revegetate, and the need for water quality improvements in the
vicinity of the parcel. See id. A property with an IPES score of zero does not qualify for
residential development under the 1987 Plan. Defendant's Memorandum Concerning
its Transfer of Development, Suitum I (No. 91-040). The 1987 Plan, however, sets up
an elaborate system of TDRs that allows for the sale and transfer of residential development rights, residential allocations and land coverage to a receiving parcel. See ill.
TRPA then allows the receiving parcel to construct a larger residential project than
normally allowed under the plan. See id. Suitum's property was assigned one residential development right and 183 square feet of land coverage, which were available for
Suitum to transfer or sell. See id.
21. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 361.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Suitum I, No. 91·040 (order).
25. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 360; Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I,
No. CV-N-91-040-ECR. The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
26. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Suitum I, No. 91-040.
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for the taking of her property and damages for the violations of
her civil rights. 27
TRPA moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the
district court concluded that ripeness was the threshold issue.28
The specific inquiry was whether Suitum must obtain approval
to sell or transfer her TDRs in order to achieve finality and
present a ripe claim to the court.29 . The district court stated
that the TDRs were a significant part of the calculus in determining the type and intensity of the property's allowed use.30
The court found that finality, in terms of the property's allowed
use, could only be determined after Suitum applied to transfer
her development rights to another property.31 In its analysis,
the district court examined previous cases, including a Ninth
Circuit decision that indicated pursuit of transfer rights is
among the list of items to be completed before a takings claim
is ripe. 32 Accordingly, the district court held that Suitum's
claim was not ripe for adjudication and granted summary
judgment to TRPA. 33
Suitum then appealed the district court's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit.34 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that Suitum was required to apply for the property's
TDRs in order to achieve finality and present the court with a
ripe claim. 35 In addition, the court found that Suitum failed to
demonstrate that a TDR application would be futile and, thus,
the futility exception to the ripeness doctrine did not apply.36

27.
28.
29.
30.

See id.
See Suitum I, No. 91-040.
See id.
See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. The court looked to Tahoe Preservation v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
638 F. Supp. 126, 132-33 & n.6 (D. Nev. 1986) vacated on other grounds, 911 F. 2d
1331, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring), and Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992).
33. See Suitum I, No. 91-040.
34. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 359.
35. See id. at 364.
36. See id.
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As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-

sion.s7

Subsequently, Suitum filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court.38 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that Suitum's regulatory-takings
claim was ripe for adjudication because TRPA's decision denying the development application was a final decision and no
further discretionary decisions remained regarding development or transfer of the property's TDRs.s9 The Supreme Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.4o The Ninth
Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to the district court.41
III.

BACKGROUND

A. THE EVOLUTION OF RIPENESS STANDARDS IN TAKINGS
CLAIMS

As there is no case or controversy unless a claim is ripe, a
takings claim's ripeness governs the power of a federal court to
act.42 The ripeness doctrine functions to avoid premature adjudication of disagreements with administrative policies.43
Ripeness refers to "conditions that must exist or standards that
must be met before a dispute is sufficiently mature to enable a

37. See id.
38. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (·Suitum

IIr>.

39. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'} Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (1997)
(·Suitum lV"). TRPA and Suitum agreed on the property's TDRs. See id. They also
agreed that no more discretionary decisions needed to be made before the TDRs could
be obtained and offered for sale. See id. The only agency decision remaining regarding
any transfer was whether the prospective buyer could lawfully use the TDRs. See id.
Despite the fact that a particular sale is subject to approval, ultimate salability was
presumed because there are many potential lawful buyers and receipt of the TDRs
would eventually be approved. See id. at 1668.
40. See id at 1670.
41. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)
(·Suitum V").
42. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §2.4.1, 114 (2d ed. 1994).
43. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (1997)
(citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967».
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court to decide a case on its merits."'" The doctrine is also intended to protect public agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects are felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way.45 If a
court determines that a plaintiff has not met specific conditions
with respect to ripeness, then the court must decline review of
the case.46
1. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York: The
Foundation for Ripeness and Regulatory Takings.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,47 the Supreme Court
identified two primary ripeness considerations: (1) the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration.48 The Supreme
Court's first significant application of ripeness principles to a
land use regulatory case occurred in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.49 In Penn Central, the owners of
Grand Central Statio~ appealed a decision of New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Commission, which denied permission to construct an office building in excess of 50 stories over
Grand Central Station.50 The owners claimed that the application of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law to land
occupied by Grand Central Station constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.51 The Supreme Court rejected the takings claim, noting that other possible beneficial uses of the site existed that would be acceptable

44. Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The
Florida Private Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 416 (1995) (detailing both federal and State of Florida ripeness history and standards).
45. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 14849).
46. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 115.
47. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
48. See id. at 14849. The Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rule requiring inclusion of generic names for prescription drugs on all labels and advertising
was considered ripe for preenforcement judicial review due to the substantial hardship
upon the plaintiffs of denying preenforcement review. See id. at 153-54.
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
50. See id. at 116-19.
51. See id. at 119.
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to the Landmarks Preservation Commission.52 In addition, the
owners had not applied for approval of a smaller structure or
attempted to transfer their TDRs to other parcels in the vicinity.53 The decision provided the foundation for subsequent requirements that an applicant, whose development proposal was
denied, modify or resubmit the application before a case is
ripe. 54

2. Agins v. City of Tiburon: Final Regulatory Decision
Required for Ripeness
The next landmark land use regulation case in which the
Supreme Court applied the ripeness doctrine was Agins v. City
of Tiburon. 55 In Agins, the City of Tiburon rezoned Agins'
property for residential planned development and open space
under a newly-adopted ordinance.56 Agins never sought approval for development of the property under the new zoning
ordinance, but filed suit for inverse condemnation damages and
requested that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional as a
taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.57
The Court framed the question as whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constituted a taking.58 The
Court ruled that the zoning ordinances, on their face, did not
take Agins' property without just compensation because the
ordinances substantially advanced legitimate government

52. See id. at 137. At oral argument, Penn Central's counsel admitted that the
Commission had not suggested that it would not approve a smaller structure, such as a
20 story office tower that was part of the terminal's original plan. See id. at 137 n.34.
53. See id. at 136-37. The Court found that there were at least eight parcels in the
vicinity of the terminal to which the owner could transfer his development rights. See
id. at 137. One or two of the parcels were found suitable for new office buildings. See
id. The court stated that the TDRs may not have been just compensation if a taking
had occurred, but they would have mitigated any financial burdens the Landmark
Preservation Law had imposed on the property owners. See id. Therefore, the TDRs
were to be taken into account when considering the impact of regulation. See id.
54. Maraist, supra note 44, at 422.
55. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
56. See id. at 257.
57. See id. at 257-58.
58. See id. at 260.
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goals. 59 In addition, the adoption of the zoning ordinances did
not inflict irreparable harm or a taking on the landowner because Agins could still pursue his reasonable investmentbacked expectations by submitting a development plan to the
City.6o
The key ripeness issue common to Penn Central and Agins
is that a final regulatory decision applying an ordinance or law
to the property at issue had not yet occurred because neither
claimant had exhausted the regulatory opportunities available
to obtain development approval for their properties.61 In Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn.,62 the Supreme Court went one step further and held that a regulatory
takings claim is not ripe until the applicant has exhausted
any administrative remedies contained in the disputed regulations. 63

3. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank: The Two-Hurdle Ripeness Test for Regulatory
Takings
Subsequently, the Supreme Court combined the final regulatory decision requirement and the administrative relief requirement in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank. 64 In Williamson County, the Court applied the two-hurdle test for ripeness to the application of land
use regulations on a development proposal.65 The Court stated
that the landowner must first demonstrate that a "final decision regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to
the property at issue" had been reached by the government
agency "charged with implementing the regulations[.]m6 The
landowner must then demonstrate that he has sought "com59. See id. at 261.
60. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
61. See id. at 262-63; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
62. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
63. See id. at 297. The Court referenced a variance or waiver from surface mining
regulations and restrictions as forms of administrative relief. See id.
64. 473 U.S. 172, 190, 194 (1985).
65. See id. at 186, 194.
66. [d. at 186.
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pensation through the procedures the State. has provided for
doing SO."s7
The Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
("Commission") denied applications to complete the development of a residential subdivision that had been partially constructed when the County amended its zoning ordinance.68 The
Commission modified the method of calculating allowed densities, resulting in a substantial decrease in housing units for the
project.69 The Commission later denied the project proposals
for numerous reasons, including reasons related to the zoning
ordinance changes. 7o The landowner then filed a claim alleging
that the Commission had taken its property without just. compensation under the Fifth Amendment and should be estopped
from denying approval of the project.71
The Supreme Court determined that the landowner had yet
to obtain a fmal decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property and,
therefore, failed the first, final-decision, hurdle of the ripeness
test. 72 While the landowner submitted development plans that
arguably met the previous Penn Central and Agins requirements, the Court found that the landowner did not seek the
variances required to develop the property according to the
proposed plan.73 The Court distinguished the requirement to
seek variances from the requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies prior to bringing an action.74 Exhaustion of adminis67. ld. at 194.
68. See id. at 180-82.
69. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 178-79.
70. See id. at 181. The denial was based, in part, on density problems, road
grades, lack of tire protection, length of cul-de-sacs, disrepair of the main RCCeBB road,
and minimum frontage. See id.
71. See id. at 182.
72. See id. at 186.
73. See id. at 188-90. The landowner wrote a letter to the CommiBBion stating
that it would not request variances from the Commission until after the Commission
approved the proposed plat (project plan). See id. at 190.
74. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 192-93.
While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision maker
has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual,
concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to admin-
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trative procedures is not required if the procedures are remedial in nature, such as a declaratory judgment.75
The landowner also failed the second, state-procedures,
hurdle by not using the inverse condemnation procedures that
State law provided to obtain just compensation in a taking
situation.76 The Court noted that Tennessee statutes allow a
property owner to bring an inverse condemnation action where
a taking occurs due to restrictive zoning laws or development
regulations. 77 The Court found that the landowner had not
shown that the inverse condemnation procedure, available to
obtain compensation, was unavailable or inadequate?8 Until
the landowner utilized that compensation procedure, the takings claim was premature under the test's second hurdle?9
The ripeness tests set forth in Williamson County were further refined in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.80
One of the allegations in the MacDonald complaint stated that
any application for a zone change, variance or other relief
would be futile. 8! The Court was unable to determine whether
there was a taking because no final decision on the project had
occurred.82 Nonetheless, the Court addressed the concept of
futility, noting that denial of a project does not necessarily
mean that future applications would be futile, but that a
meaningful application may not have been submitted.83

istrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek
review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is
found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.
Id at 193.
75. See id. at 193.
76. See id. at 196-97.
77. See id. at 196.
78. See id. at 196-97.
79. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 196-97.
80. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
81. See id. at 344.
82. See id. at 351-53.
83. See id. at 352-53 n.8. Refusal of a permit for intensive development does not
preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. See id.
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B. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY
RIPENESS TEST

1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Ripeness
Clarification Clouded by the Futility Exception
The Court found that futility was a deciding factor in determining the ripeness of the regulatory takings claim in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 84 Lucas bought two lots on
a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single family homes.55 Subsequently, the State enacted the Beachfront
Management Act, which barred residential development on
these parcels due to public resource concerns.86 Lucas claimed
that his property had been taken without just compensation.87
The Beachfront Management Act was then amended, prior to
the issuance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision,
allowing the Coastal Council to issue "special permits" under
certain circumstances.88 These special permits would allow
construction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline.89
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the Council's contention that Lucas' claim was not ripe
for failure to apply for a special permit.90 The Court noted that
such an application was not available at the time the case was
argued in the South Carolina Supreme Court and that the
taking, under the Act as read prior to the amendment, was unconditional and permanent.91 As any application would have

84. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992).
85. See ill. at 1006-07.
86. See ill. at 1007. Lucas bought the properties in 1986. See id. at 1006. The
Beachfront Management Act, enacted in 1988, established a "baseline connecting the

landward-most points of erosion during the past forty years!,]" such that "construction
of occupiable improvements was flatly prohibited seaward of a line drawn 20 feet
landward of and parallel to the baseline!,)" with no exceptions. See ill at 1008-09.
87. See ill. at 1009.
88. See ill. at 1010-11.
89. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011.
90. See ill. at 1010-13.
91. See ill. at 1012.
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been pointless and futile under the 1988 Act, the claim had attained finality and was ripe for review.92

2. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: A Pure
Regulatory Takings Ripeness Case for the Supreme Court
Despite the tests and precedents provided by the abovementioned cases, lower courts, landowners and regulatory
agencies have had difficulty applying the ripeness rule to
regulatory takings cases.93 The Suitum case, where ripeness
was the sole issue presented, provided the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to clarify the application of the ripeness doctrine in regulatory takings cases.94
IV.

COURTS' ANALYSIS

The threshold issue in Suitum was whether the plaintiffs
takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
was ripe for adjudication.95 The Ninth Circuit based its decision that the claim was· not ripe mainly on its conclusion that
the TDRs allocated to the property might constitute a valuable
use that abated the alleged taking.96 Suitum, therefore, needed
a final government decision, to secure and transfer the TDRs to
determine the extent of deveiopment allowed the property.97
The United States Supreme Court approached the TDRs differently and concluded that a final decision had been reached and
no further actions were needed to determine the TDRs' value.98
The concurrence focused on whether TDRs should be considered in a takings ripeness decision and whether they are a

92. See id. at 1012. The Coastal Council had stipulated that a building permit
would not have issued under the 1988 Act, application or no application. See id at 1012
n.3.
93. Maraist, supra note 44, at 421.
94. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664.
95. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Suitum Ir>.
96. See id. at 362.
97. See id. at 362-63.
98. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1667-68 (1997)
("Suitum IV").
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property use or merely compensation for a taking.99 Each of
these opinions will likely affect the ultimate outcome of the
Suitum case when it is reheard at the district court level.
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Under the court's interpretation of Williamson County, a
regulatory takings claim is ripe when the "final decision" and
"state procedures" prudential hurdles have been met prior to
filing the case. lOO In Suitum, the Ninth Circuit noted that only
the first hurdle, the final-decision requirement, was at issue on
appeal. lOl
The court found that no final decision had been reached as
to how Suitum would be allowed to use her property because
she had not applied to transfer her TDRs. lo2 A TDR transfer
application was necessary to determine the extent of use of
Suitum's property. loa A regulatory taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment occurs only if the regulation denies an owner
all economically viable use of the land.104

99. See id. at 1670-72 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362 (citing Williamson County Regl Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985». The plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) the government entity charged with implementing the regulations alleged to
have resulted in a taking has reached a final decision on the regulation's application to
the property at issue and (2) the plaintiff has pursued any "reasonable, certain and
adequate" provisions that the agency has established for obtaining compensation at the
time of the taking. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186,194.
101. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 362. The district court's decision focused only on the
finality test and did not address the compensation test. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum n. The district court found that a
TDR transfer application was the only meaningful application that could be made once
the property was determined to be within the SEZ designation. See id. As Suitum had
not filed the application, there was no finality. See id.
102. See Suitum 11,80 F.3d at 362.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 361 (citing Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson 37 F.3d 468,
473 (9th Cir. 1994». The Suitum court noted that the definition of "economically viable
use" had yet to be determined with much precision. See id. at 361-62. Relevant factors
are the regulation's economic impact and the extent to which it interferes with investment backed expectations. See id. at 362 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978».
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that without an application for
transfer of the TDRs, TRPA was foreclosed from determining
the nature and extent of the use and development permitted for
Suitum's property.105 The court viewed the TDRs as "uses" of
Suitum's property under TRPA's regulations. lOG As such, the
TDRs were an alternative use of a SEZ property that was not
materially different from other alternative uses a property
owner may seek when denied approval for a proposed development. 107 Without an application for sale or transfer of the
TDRs, the court could not determine the extent of the property
rights that Suitum possessed and, therefore, could not know
the full economic impact of the regulations on Suitum's property.lOB
Suitum claimed that an application to sell or transfer her
TDRs would be futile because the TDR program was a "sham"
that had produced no sales and, thus, no market value for her
TDRs.l09 The Ninth Circuit recognized the limited futility exception to the ripeness doctrine set forth in Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey Ltd. v. City of Monterey. 110 The court held the futility
exception to be inapplicable, however, because Suitum's TDRs
had some significant value.l11 Therefore, participation in the
TDR program was not a futile endeavor to achieve an economic
use of the property.112
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Suitum's claims were not
ripe because of a failure to apply for TDRs pursuant to TRPA's
program and a failure to demonstrate that such an application

105. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d at 362.
106. See id. at 363.
107. See id. In taking this approach, the court was distinguishing TDRs as a use of
the property or property right as opposed to compensation for regulatory restrictions on
the use of the property. See id.
108. See id. at 362-63.
109. See id. at 363.
110. 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1990).
111. See Suitum 11, 80 F.3d at 363-64. The court held that evidence supported a
market value of $10,000 to $21,500 for the development rights with an additional value
of $30,000 if accompanied by a development allocation right. See id. at 363.
112. See id. at 364.
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would be futile. u3 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to TRPA.u4
B. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
In response to the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the district

court's holding, Suitum filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, which the Court granted.1l5
Like the courts below, the Supreme Court applied the Williamson County finality rule to the ripeness issue. us The majority
and concurring opinions differed in their assessment of
TDRs.ll7

1. The Majority Opinion

The majority found that the facts in Suitum were distinguishable from prior landmark ripeness cases.us The Court
noted that the prior landmark cases were not ripe because further regulatory steps existed that the plaintiffs could have
taken to reach a final decision regarding the properties' allowed uses. U9
The Suitum Court found no further regulatory steps existed
because no questions remained regarding how TRPA's development and TDR regulations applied to the property.120 The

113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) ("Suitum
lV").

116. See id. at 1664-65.
117. See id. at 1662. (Souter, J. delivered the opinion of the court in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which
O'Conner, Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined in part and concurred in part.)
118. See id. 1665-67;
119. See id. In Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the property owner
challenged the enactment of a zoning statute without having submitted a development
plan for the property. See Agins, 447 U.S.257. Ripeness was lacking because there
was no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions.
See id. at 260. In Hrxkl v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. Inc. 452 U.S.
264 (1981) and Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), takings challenges were unripe because the plaintiff had
not yet applied for the variances potentially allowed by the regulations.
120. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1667.
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Court noted that: 1) the parties had agreed on the particular
TDRs to which Suitum was entitled; and 2) no discretionary
decision was required of any agency official before Suitum
could obtain the TDRs or offer them for sale. l21 Although
agency approval was needed to allow a given buyer to lawfully
use the TDRs, the Court concluded that enough potential buyers capable of meeting TRPA's approval existed and, thus, the
TDRs were salable. l22 As a result, the final decision requirement of the ripeness test was met. 123
The Supreme Court did not assess the second ripeness requirement, that the landowner seek compensation through the
procedures provided by the State prior to filing a regulatory
taking claim, because it found that the "state procedures" compensation test was inapplicable. l24 The Court noted that ordinarily a plaintiff must seek compensation if the state provides
adequate procedures or remedies for inverse condemnation.l25
In this case, however, TRPA maintained that it did not have
provisions for paying just compensation, thus, implying that
there were no applicable "state procedures. "126
The Court then addressed TRPA's argument that the case
was not ripe because the value of Suitum's TDRs could not be
determined without an actual, prospective sale, subject to
TRPA's approval. 127 While Suitum had not yet offered the
TDRs for sale, the Court determined that a sale was not necessary to determine their value. l28 The Court found that the
class of TDR buyers qualified to receive TRPA approval was
broad enough to conclude that the TDRs were salable.l29 Addi121. See id.
122. See id. at 1667-68.
123. See id. at 166B.
124. See id. at 1665 n.B.
125. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.B.
126. See id. Suitum's counsel stated TRPA's position at oral argument and TRPA's
counsel did not object to the implication that the agency was not subject to inverse
condemnation proceedings. See id.
127. See id. at 1668.
12B. See id.
129. See id. TRPA and Suitum agreed on the particular TDRs entitled to the property and that no discretionary decisions remained to be made by any agency official in
order to obtain the TDRs or to offer them for sale. See id at 1667. The only remaining
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tionally, the Court found that the TDRs' market value could be
determined by opinion evidence without the benefit of a pending sale. 130 Therefore, the TDRs' valuation was simply an issue
of market prices, on which considerable evidence had already
been presented to the district court.l3l The Court concluded
that the ripeness doctrine did not require Suitum to obtain a
prospective buyer for her TDRs or apply for TRPA's approval to
determine the level of compensation appropriate for the takings c1aim. 132
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Suitum's regulatory takings claim was ripe for adjudication because a final decision denying the development application had occurred and
no further discretionary decisions remained regarding transfer
and valuation of the property's TDRs. l33 The Court vacated the
Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings. l34 The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to
the district court with directions to consider the second prong
of the Williamson County test; state procedures for seeking
compensation. l35
2. The Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
argued that the majority incorrectly applied the final decision
requirement of the ripeness doctrine in Suitum. 136 The concurrence declared that the final decision was TRPA's denial of Suitum's development request, for this denial determined the

agency decision was whether a prospective buyer could lawfully use the TDRs. See id.
Even if a particular sale was subject to approval, ultimate salability was presumed
since there were many lawful potential buyers ensuring that ultimately transfer and
receipt of the TDRs would be approved. See id at 1668.
130. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1669.
131. See id. at 1668.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1667, 1670. The final· decision was TRPA's denial of development
and subsequent denial of the appeal of the property's SEZ classification and IPES
score. See id. at 1663, 1670.
134. See id. at 1670.
135. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'} Planning Agency, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Suitum V").
136. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1670.
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permissible use of Suitum's land.137 The decision on the TDRs
was not relevant in the final decision analysis because TDRs
were not a "use" of the land. l38 While the majority did not decide whether TDRs should be considered a use of the property
in evaluating a takings claim, the concurrence maintained that
TDRs are a new right conferred upon a landowner for compensation in exchange for a taking and not a residual right or
use. 139
The concurrence viewed TDRs only as a compensation vehicle to be used in assessing whether the landowner had been
adequately compensated for the taking.140 The opinion further
suggested that TDRs are not "undesirable or devious[,]" but
serve the purpose of mitigating the economic loss of a restricted-use property.l4l As such, TDRs are not appropriate in
offsetting restrictions that would otherwise be sufficient to produce a compensable taking and should not be taken into account when assessing whether a taking has occurred.l42

v. CRITIQUE
A.

SUITUM: RIPE FOR TAKINGS UNDER FINAL DECISION AND
STATE PROCEDURES HURDLES

The United States Supreme Court held that Suitum was
ripe for adjudication, but did not decide whether a taking had
occurred. l43 The Court correctly found that Suitum met the
"final decision" requirement for ripeness because no discretionary decisions remained in allocating the TDRs to Suitum's

137. See id. at 1673.
138. See id. at 1671.
139. See id. at 1662, 1671. The concurrence stated that the Penn Central precedent
of recognizing TDRs as a potential property right in considering the impact of a regulation should be distinguished from Suitum because the property owners in Penn Central
owned additional surrounding properties that could directly benefit from the TDRs.
See id at 1672.
140. See id. at 1670-71.
141. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. See id. at 1672.
143. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (1997)
(MSuitum lV").
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property.l44 While it might appear that considerable TRPA
involvement was necessary to validate any sale or transfer of
the TDRs, ultimately, an acceptable buyer for Suitum's TDRs
would be found. l45 With ample evidence that the value of the
TDRs could be appraised, it logically follows that the value of
the TDRs becomes an issue of their market price, and not an
issue dependent upon further administrative decisions by
TRPA. 146 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the case was
ripe based upon the "final decision" test and remanded it to the
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.147
1. Clarification on Williamson

County State Procedures
Ripeness Hurdle Avoided in Suitum
The Supreme Court decision ostensibly reverses prior Ninth
Circuit decisions requiring finalization of TDRs prior to ripeness. l48 The actual effect of the decision, however, is uncertain
because the majority opinion narrowly applied only the first
step, "final decision" hurdle, of the Williamson County ripeness
test. 149 Application of the second step "state procedures" compensation requirement was not before the Court, leaving it
open for interpretation. 150
In contrast, the concurrence strongly argued that TDRs are
not relevant to the "final decision" requirement because they

144. See id. at 1667.
145. See id. at 1668.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1670.
148. See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911
F.2d 1331, 1344 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher J. concurring); Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'!
Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1324-25 (D. Nev. 1992): Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132-33 & n.6 (D. Nev.
1986), vacated on other grounds, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990).
149. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. This was the only step of the test the Ninth
Circuit addressed. See Suitum II, 80 F.3d 359.
150. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. Previous regulatory ripeness cases decided
by the Court under the Williamson County ripeness test were either found to be unripe
due to lack of finality, see e.g. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S.
340, 351 (1986); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 194 (1985), or ripe due to finality, but with no applicable state compensation
procedure to examine, see e.g. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1012, 1014 n.3 (1992).
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are not a use of the land, but are a compensation system for a
regulatory taking. 151 The majority did not expressly reject the
concurrence's position. 152 The result is a majority opinion that
provides no clear direction to the Ninth Circuit regarding application of TDRs to the ripeness, takings, and compensation
issues; and a concurrence that is clearly contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's current assessment of TDRs in land use regulation
takings cases. l53 The Ninth Circuit will now need to determine
(1) whether TDRs have a relevant application within the Williamson County "state procedures" ripeness hurdle and (2) how
to apply the takings and adequate compensation tests to Suitum's TDRs. I54
2. Application of State Procedures Requirement to Sui tum
The actions available to the district court in applying the
"state procedures" requirement in Suitum appear straightforward. Under the state procedures requirement, a property
owner claiming a regulatory taking must seek compensation
through procedures set up by the state for that purpose.155 A
reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation must have existed at the time of the taking.156 If the
government has provided an adequate process for compensation, then the property owner does not have a takings claim
until the process has been used and just compensation has
been denied. 157 The district court will likely determine, as
TRPA has asserted, that TRPA has no compensation process
available to Suitum and that Suitum's TDRs are a property
right and not a compensation measure. l58 Accordingly, Sui-

151. See Suitum IV, 117 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 1670.
153. See id. at 1668-71. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 91-040 (D. Nev.
Apr. I, 1996) ("Suitum r); Tahoe-Sierra, 911 F.2d 1331; Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, S04 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992).
154. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1670; Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Suitum V").
155. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95.
156. See id. at 194. (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
124-25 (1974».
157. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195.
15S. Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.S.
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tum's complaint will be ripe based upon the "final decision"
holding of the Supreme Court.159
If the district court reverses its previous position that TDRs
are a property right or property use and finds that TDRs are
part of some type of compensation program, then it will need to
assess the extent to which Suitum has participated in the program. l60 Following the Supreme Court's holding that the
amount of Suitum's TDRs has already been determined, such
that their value can be appraised, the claim is ripe because
Suitum participated in the state procedures sufficiently to determine the level of compensation due to her property.161
B. TDRs: A PROPERTY RIGHT OR COMPENSATION FOR A
TAKING?

Finding that the "state procedures" test is either inapplicable or has been met, the district court will need to determine
whether a taking has occurred.162 A key issue will be whether
the court finds that Suitum's TDRs are rights and beneficial
uses of the property, and whether the TDRs, along with other
limited residual uses of the property, constitute sufficient beneficial use to preclude a taking. l63 The final outcome of this
analysis will be of enormous significance to the future use of
TDRs in the Lake Tahoe Basin and throughout the country. If
TDRs are found to be merely a compensation measure for
regulatory taking, governments will be required to augment

159. See id. at 1667.
160. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95.
161. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1668-69. The Supreme Court stated that the compensation values attributed to the TDRs could be determined; therefore it was unnecessary for Suitum to finalize the TDR allocation and sales. See id.
162. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194.
163. See Affidavit of Susan E. Scholley in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996). Specific allowed uses included vegetation, such as gardening and landscaping, and structures that allowed 75% or more of precipitation to reach the ground, such as chaise
lounges and patio tables, jungle gyms, swing sets, pet enclosures, picnic tables, volleyball or badminton sets, and garden trellises. See id.
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any shortfalls in the value of the TDRs to provide full compensation for the taking. l64
1. TDRs as a Property Right in the Development of a Regional
Planning Area

TDRs are a development right because they represent a
fractional share of the cumulative development allowed for the
entire region, as determined by TRPA's regional environmental
thresholds and cumulative carrying capacity analysis.l65 When
the TDRs are allocated to individual parcels, that allocation is
conceptually the same as any other zoning or planning process
that restricts development potential according to valid policepower purposes and rationally assigns development densities
and uses to individual properties, which may then become
vested property rights upon development application
approval. 166
Thus, TDRs may be viewed as an extension of basic zoning
principles, as in Barancik v. County of Marin,167 where the
Ninth Circuit determined that TDRs constituted valid development rights that could be purchased to increase the development potential of a property beyond that normally allowed
under the zoning ordinance. l68 California state courts within
the Ninth Circuit have also positively identified TDRs as a type
of property right, with the characteristics of real property.169

164. See Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum u. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 179, 201 (Spring
1997). The essay, written after oral arguments and before the opinion, discusses the
relevance of the case to property rights issues generally and TDRs specifically. See id.
at 181.
165. See Regional Plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
September 17, 1986.
166. See Communication from Roy Gorman, Associate Professor of Law, Golden
Gate University Law School (January 11, 1998), on tile with author.
167. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1989).
168. See id. at 837. The court found that the Marin County TDR program, allowing
for accumulation of development rights through purchase from owners in the same
area, was rationally related to preservation of agriculture and did not result in an
increase in the total amount of development possible in the rural corridor. See id.
169. See Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A) Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 356,
357 Cal, Ct, apphe one of the fractional interests in the complex bundle of rights aria-
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Similarly, TRPA has maintained that its TDR program was
based upon TDRs as part of the bundle of rights associated
with properties within its jurisdiction and not an inverse condemnation compensation program.170
2. TDRs as a Marketable Beneficial Use of a Property
In addition, TDRs can provide economic value to Suitum's

property through their market sales value within the Tahoe
Basin; thus, it is reasonable that the district court view TDRs
as an appurtenant property right conferring a beneficial use to
Suitum's property.l7l This position is also consistent with the
TDR precedents set forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central and with the public policy and environmental management
priorities of the congressionally approved Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact. 172
If the district court finds that TDRs are a property right and
hence a beneficial use of the property, then TDRs, along with
other residual uses of the land, must be assessed to determine
if a taking has occurred.173 The standard for inverse condemnation is where a regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of the land.174 The TDRs do have economic

ing from ownership of land and subject to real estate tax assessment upon transfer to a
receiving property. See id at 528.
170. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1663, 1665, n.8.
171. See id. at 1663; Mitsui Fudosan, 268 Cal. Rptr. At 358. TDRs allowing maximum floor area ratios to be exceeded were subject to hallmarks of real property transfer with agreements that the TDRs be appurtenant to and used for the benefit of the
real property owned by the buyer. See Mitsui Fudosan , 268 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29.
172. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360; Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
173. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922».
174. See id. at 1015. The Court noted that a determination of the Mdeprivation of all
economically feasible use" rule is imprecise, such that a regulation requiring 90% of a
rural tract to remain in its natural state may deprive the owner of all economically
beneficial use of the burdened portion of the property, or be a mere diminution in the
value of the tract as a whole. See id. at 1016 n.7. The Lucas Court went on to comment that the decision in Penn Central was an extreme and insupportable view of
economic use, implying that TDRs should not figure heavily in determining the ec0nomic use of a property. See id. The concurring opinion in Suitum presented a similar
view of TDRs, and distinguished Penn Central from Suitum because the landowner in

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7

112 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:87
value, providing an economically-beneficial use of the land;
thus, the property has not lost all economic use and a taking
has not occurred.175
Suitum argued that TDRs are merely administrative creations that do not constitute a use of the land and are not a substitute for a right to build a home. 176 This argument ignores
the fact that properties are often regulated to restrict or change
the purchaser's anticipated allowable uses, but a taking will
not occur as long as some economic or beneficial use remains.177
The TDRs, in essence, represent new economic, and thus beneficial, uses of the property that replace more intensive uses determined to be environmentally damaging to Lake Tahoe.178
The position presented by the concurring opinion, that
TDRs have nothing to do with the use of the land and are
merely chits redeemable on the market for compensation, did
not take into account the real-property nature of the TDRs.179
TDRs often bear all the hallmarks of real property transfers;
such as escrow accounts, escrow instructions, purchase and
sale agreements, title reports and title insurance, and restrictive covenants. 180 TDRs are much more than mere chits and
can directly affect the development patterns and densities of
receiving properties within the planning region.
The substantial market value of the TDRs as property
rights and their beneficial use to the holding and receiving

Penn Central owned nearby property that could benefit from the TDRs. See Suitum N,
117 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1663. The development rights, together with an
allocation right and land coverage, were valued at approximately $35,600 to $44,700,
and the land without development rights was valued at $7,125 to $16,750 for a total
approximate value of $42,725 to $61,450. See id. at 1664. Suitum originally purchased the property for $28,000 in 1972. Deposition of Bernadine Suitum, Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, NO. 91-040 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 1996) ("Suitum n.
176. See Petitioner's Brief at 19-20, Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 96-243).
177. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16; .Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 137-38 n.36.
178. See Tahoe Regional Planning Agency Code of Ordinances, Chapter 34, Transfer of Development.
179. See Suitum N, 117 S. Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. See Mitsui Fudosan, 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 529.
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properties provide ample support for the District Court to find
that Suitum retains substantial economic use of her
property. 181 Therefore, the court could reasonably determine
that TRPA's regulations have not gone too far and no inverse
condemnation or taking of Suitum's property had occurred.182
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the regulatory and TDR allocation application environment under which this case was brought, the Supreme
Court's decision in Sui tum clarifies that courts must look beyond the mere existence of another structured, regulatory step
in testing the "final decision" requirement for ripeness. l83
Courts must fully examine the extent to which that step has a
truly discretionary component, which makes finality unpredictable in terms of Williamson County.l84 In addition, the
ruling implies that the second, state procedures, requirement
of the test may be fulfilled without action by the property
owner if the level of compensation allowed under state procedures is nondiscretionary and can be determined through testimony.l85
The concurring opinion goes too far in labeling TDRs a device that only provides for property takings compensation and
not a property right to be assessed when evaluating whether a
taking has occurred. l86 The nature of TDRs vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may represent transfers of actual property uses and densities through transactions similar to real
property sales, making it evident that TDRs are a part of the
bundle of property rights within thatjurisdiction.187

181. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
182. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
183. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1667·68 (1997)
("Suitum lV").
184. See id. at 1668-69.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1671.
187. See Barancik v. Mann, 872 F.2d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1989); Mitsui Fudosan v.
Los Angeles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 356, 527-29 (1990);
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The Ninth Circuit may have an opportunity to re-visit Suitum if t~e district court's pending decision is appealed. The
Ninth Circuit has adequate precedent and evidence on the record to both accept TRPA's assertion that TDRs are legitimate
property rights, and not merely compensation for a taking, and
to hold that no taking has occurred because TRPA's regulations
have not resulted in the loss of all economic use of Suitum's
land. ISS Should the Ninth Circuit find that no taking has occurred, it is likely that Suitum will return to the Supreme
Court for further deliberation on TDRs as a takings versus
compensation, followed possibly by deliberation on the amount
of loss in economic use required for a regulatory taking.
Michael B. Hitchcock*
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